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Abstract
I examine ﬁscal policy uncertainty in a context where market participants learn about the
conduct of ﬁscal policy with regression rules for dependent variables including tax revenue, net
transfers, government spending, and government debt. The explanatory variables include lagged
ﬁscal policy, lagged government debt, and macroeconomic outcomes including real GDP, con-
sumption, investment, and the unemployment rate. They re-run these regressions each quarter
as a new observation becomes available, updating their understanding of the conduct of ﬁscal
policy. I use the root mean squared errors as measures for ﬁscal policy uncertainty. I use
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models to estimate the eﬀect ﬁscal uncertainty has on
macroeconomic outcomes including real GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment. I
ﬁnd that the common component for ﬁscal policy uncertainty has adverse eﬀects on real GDP,
consumption, and investment. I ﬁnd the buildup of ﬁscal policy uncertainty from 2005 through
2009 leads to a decline in real GDP growth by about 2 percentage points. I demonstrate that
these ﬁnding are robust to lag speciﬁcations for the ARDL models and parameter speciﬁcations
for the learning process.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the United States experienced a severe ﬁnancial crisis, the worst economic downturn
since the Great Depression, and unprecedented ﬁscal and monetary policy actions have been accom-
panied with only a slow recovery. Add to this strong political partisan divisions, with some arguing
for more economic stimulus or more economic assistance for those in need, and others arguing for
contraction in government spending and transfers.
These economic and political hardships have come with renewed interest in what eﬀect uncer-
tainty concerning government policy has on the macroeconomy. In a July 2012 monetary policy
report to the U.S. Congress, then Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke suggested that the most
eﬀective way that Congress can support the economic recovery is to design long-run policy that
removes uncertainty concerning the ﬁscal stance of the Federal Government, which he suggested
could help boost consumer and business conﬁdence.1
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new way to quantify ﬁscal policy uncertainty that
is based on a realistic framework for forming expectations, and use this measure to estimate the
eﬀect that ﬁscal policy uncertainty has the macroeconomy. I construct a measure for ﬁscal policy
uncertainty using least-squares learning, an expectations mechanism where market participants have
a more restricted information set than what is typically assumed in rational expectations models. It
is common when using rational expectations to assume that market participants have knowledge of
the equations and parameters governing ﬁscal policy behavior, and the only source of uncertainty is
in future realizations of a stochastic shock (though I cite some notable exceptions concerning ﬁscal
policy in the next section). Evans and Honkapohja (2011) argue that rational expectations models
like these violate the cognitive consistency principle. That is, the rational expectations framework
assumes that market participants have a higher degree of knowledge concerning the law of motion
for economic variables than the economists themselves who write down the model.
I suppose that market participants' knowledge and expectations behavior is similar to what
might be expected of an applied econometrician. Market participants have statistical models for
the behavior for ﬁscal policy variables, and they estimate these models in each period with data
1See Bernanke (2012). In closing his discussion of risks to the U.S. economic outlook, Bernanke's precise words
were, The most eﬀective way that the Congress could help to support the economy right now would be to work to
address the nation's ﬁscal challenges in a way that takes into account both the need for long-run sustainability and
the fragility of the recovery. Doing so earlier rather than later would help reduce uncertainty and boost household
and business conﬁdence.
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that precedes it. Expectations evolve according to least-squares learning in the style of Evans
and Honkapohja (2001). In each new period, a new observation becomes available and market
participants re-estimate their regressions and the prediction from the updated regression serves
as their expectation. Following the method in Herro and Murray (2013) in their examination of
monetary policy uncertainty, I interpret the root mean squared errors from these regressions as
ﬁscal policy uncertainty, as it is a measure of ﬁscal policy variability that is not explained by
past behavior or previous data. Also, the variance for forecasts for ﬁscal policy based on these
regression models are direct functions of the mean squared error. Orlik and Veldkamp (2013) have
a similar construction for economic uncertainty, though they consider a more sophisticated statistical
procedure for expectations formation in an environment which also includes model uncertainty.
I obtain measures of ﬁscal policy uncertainty for government expenditures, tax revenue, net
transfers and government debt. These measures are all highly correlated, so I estimate and isolate
the common component using a standard dynamic factor model. To determine the eﬀect ﬁscal policy
uncertainty has on the macroeconomy, I estimate autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models for
dependent variables including real GDP, consumption, investment, and unemployment. The set of
explanatory variables in each ARDL includes lags of a larger set of macroeconomic variables, lagged
ﬁscal policy variables, and ﬁscal policy uncertainty variables, including separate measures for each
of the four ﬁscal policy variables mentioned above and the common component for ﬁscal policy
uncertainty. To check for robustness, I run a number of speciﬁcations with diﬀerent lag lengths
and diﬀerent speciﬁcations for market participants' regression equations. I ﬁnd consistent evidence
that government expenditures uncertainty and tax uncertainty negatively aﬀect investment, while
transfers uncertainty is related to a decrease in unemployment. While less robust to the model
speciﬁcation, I also ﬁnd evidence that tax uncertainty and government debt uncertainty negatively
aﬀects consumption and real GDP. The common component of ﬁscal policy uncertainty is shown to
be contractionary in nearly all speciﬁcations.
2 Literature
Fernández-Villiverde et al. (2011a), Born and Pfeifer (2011), and Johannsen (2012) ﬁnd signiﬁcant
evidence of time-varying volatility in ﬁscal shocks. These papers focus on uncertainty speciﬁcally
regarding ﬁscal policy and they complement a larger literature that examines the eﬀect of time-
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varying economic uncertainty on business cycles (see, for example, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008),
Bloom (2009), Fernández-Villiverde et al. (2011b), and Bloom et al. (2012)). Using a New Keynesian
business cycle model calibrated to the U.S. economy, Fernández-Villiverde et al. (2011a) ﬁnd that
ﬁscal uncertainty has stagﬂationary eﬀects. An increase in the volatility of ﬁscal shocks leads to a
decrease economic activity for several quarters and an increase in aggregate price level through the
optimal price setting channel with sticky prices. Born and Pfeifer (2011) estimate a similar model
with U.S. data and ﬁnd that ﬁscal uncertainty is unlikely to be a driving factor explaining U.S.
business cycles. They demonstrate that there are counteracting partial equilibrium eﬀects that can
mute the eﬀects of uncertainty. Fernández-Villiverde et al. (2011a) defend the concern to place on
ﬁscal policy uncertainty, but not because typical ﬁscal volatility shocks should be on average an
important driver of business cycles. Rather, the occasional large shock has large adverse eﬀects.
This should especially be of concern when an increase in policy risk comes at the same time that
policy is attempting to counteract economic contraction, which is arguably the case in the wake of
the Great Recession in the United States.2
Some studies do suggest that ﬁscal policy uncertainty may have been a particularly impor-
tant concern during the Great Recession and subsequent recovery. Johannsen (2012) demonstrates
that the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy uncertainty is magniﬁed when monetary policy is at its zero lower
bound. Baker et al. (2013) construct their own measure of economic policy uncertainty based on
the frequency of newspaper headlines concerning policy uncertainty in ten leading news papers, the
number of federal tax code provisions that are soon due to expire, and the extent of disagreement
among professional forecasters. They ﬁnd that an increase in policy uncertainty in the magnitude
that they ﬁnd from 2006-2011 reduces industrial production by 2.5% and total employment by 2.3
million.
A related literature on ﬁscal policy uncertainty focuses speciﬁcally on uncertainty concerning
long-term ﬁscal ﬁnancing. Bi et al. (2013) show that when there is uncertainty considering the
timing and composition (whether spending-based or tax-based) of ﬁscal consolidations, economic
agents do not rule out the possibility for undesirable conditions for an upcoming ﬁscal consolidation
(for example, a tax-based consolidation). Expectations and behavior react immediately which can
have contractionary eﬀects (relative to a situation where a more desirable composition for ﬁscal
2Fernández-Villiverde et al. (2011a) and Born and Pfeifer (2011) do not explicitly model such a case. Fiscal
uncertainty shocks are modeled as independent innovations to an autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic process.
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contraction was known with certainty). Davig et al. (2010) show that uncertainty regarding the
government's long-term plan for ﬁnancing entitlement programs can be stagﬂationary. When the
costs for entitlement programs follow unsustainable paths, it is expected that either the government
will eventually renege on its obligations or that the monetary authority will switch to a passive
policy that does not react more than one-to-one to inﬂation, allowing surprise increases in the price
level that decrease the real value of government debt and transfer obligations. When agents put a
positive probability on the latter, it can create an environment of suppressed economic activity and
inﬂation that even an active monetary authority can adequately control.
Richter and Throckmorton (2013) and Davig and Foerster (2013) consider models and expec-
tations environments where there is uncertainty on upcoming policy changes. Davig and Foerster
(2013) construct a model of expiring tax provisions in which uncertainty exists whether a tax policy
will expire at a predetermined expiration date, or if it will be extended. They show that this uncer-
tainty can lead to a drop in investment and unemployment. Motivated by situations like expiring
tax policies and uncertain possibility for extension, Richter and Throckmorton (2013) develop a
model with regime switching in the long-run debt to GDP level. They show that uncertainty may
be welfare improving or welfare reducing, depending on whether agents' expectations are consistent
with future realizations for the debt to GDP state. They suggest that the recent U.S. experience
concerning the expiring Bush-era tax cuts was likely contractionary. When economic agents under-
estimated the debt target, and therefore overestimated the future ﬂow of taxes, they under-invested
relative to what they would do under certainty.
3 Expectations
3.1 Least Squares Learning
Market participants expect that ﬁscal policy variables follow feedback rules that respond to eco-
nomic conditions, past behavior of ﬁscal policy, and the recent level of government debt. Let
ft = [gt rt nt bt]
′ denote the time t vector of ﬁscal policy variables under consideration, where gt is
real government expenditures, rt is real tax revenue, nt is real net transfers, and bt is real govern-
ment debt. All of these variables are observed at the quarterly frequency, quantities are measured in
per-capita terms and taken as a ratio of the previous quarter's level of real GDP per capita, and all
ﬁscal variables are an aggregate of U.S. federal, state, and local governments. Market participants
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estimate the following regression every period to update their understanding of the conduct of ﬁscal
policy:
f it = α
i
0 + (α
i
f )
′ft−1 + αiyyt + α
i
cct + α
i
IIt + α
i
uut + 
i
t, (1)
Equation (1) is estimated for each fi,t, the ith ﬁscal policy variable in the vector, ft. The explana-
tory variables include real GDP (yt), real consumption expenditures (ct), real investment It, and
unemployment (ut). Again, these variables are observed at a quarterly frequency, the quantities for
real GDP, real consumption, and real investment are put in per-capita terms and expressed as a
ratio of the previous quarter's level of real GDP per capita; and unemployment is expressed as a
percentage rate.
Equation (1) is rich in its set of explanatory variables, but it includes important features from
other ﬁscal feedback rules used in the macroeconomics literature. In the most simple ﬁscal policy
frameworks, such as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Chung et al. (2007), tax revenues only
respond to past government debt-to-GDP. Davig and Leeper (2006) also let tax revenues respond
contemporaneously to government spending and the output gap, the latter which can be considered
a combination of automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy to target real GDP. Favero and
Monacelli (2003) use feedback rules on ﬁscal deﬁcits, where deﬁcits can exhibit persistence, and
respond to debt-to-GDP, the output gap, and the interest rate net of the output growth rate.
Equation (1) contains many of these features. By allowing each ﬁscal policy variable to respond
to the vector, ft−1, each ﬁscal policy variable can have persistence, and recent ﬁscal policy behavior
may eﬀect all the other ﬁscal policy variables. The rule allows for all ﬁscal variables to respond
to lagged debt-to-GDP as this is also included in ft−1. The feedback on output, consumption,
investment, and unemployment allow for a rich set of discretionary policy and automatic stabilizers.
Market participants update their understanding of ﬁscal policy in each time period by re-
estimating equation (1) for each ﬁscal policy variable, using data up through period t − 1. Let
xt = [1 f
′
t−1 yt ct It ut]′ denote the vector of explanatory variables used to predict f it , and let
αˆi,OLSt = [αˆ
i,OLS
0,t (αˆ
i,OLS
f,t )
′ αˆi,OLSy,t αˆ
i,OLS
c,t αˆ
i,OLS
I,t αˆ
i,OLS
u,t ]
′ denote the time t ordinary least-squares
estimate for the coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcient estimates for the ith ﬁscal policy variable are given by,
αˆi,OLSt =
(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
xt−τx′t−τ
)−1(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
xt−τf it−τ
)
. (2)
Fiscal Policy Uncertainty and Its Macroeconomic Consequences 6
This can be re-written in the recursive form,
αˆi,OLSt = αˆ
i,OLS
t−1 + γtR
−1
t xt−1
(
f it−1 − x′t−1αˆi,OLSt−1
)
(3)
Rt = Rt−1 + γt
(
xt−1x′t−1 −Rt−1
)
, (4)
where γt = 1/t is the learning gain and is equal to the weight given to the most recent observation.
The recursive form illustrates the manner in which expectations formed by least-squares predictions
are adaptive. Equation (3) shows that the most recent estimate for the coeﬃcient vector is equal
to the previous estimate, plus a correction factor which depends on the weight given to the most
recent observation (γt) and the size of the prediction error implied from the previous estimate (the
term in parentheses on the right-hand-side).
Absent of any stochastic shocks or changes in the structure of the data generating process, under
ordinary least-squares the learning gain converges to zero, the coeﬃcients converge to some set of
values, and any dynamics or uncertainty due to adaptive expectations disappears. If the learning
gain were to be replaced with a constant, γt = γ, ∀t, where γ ∈ (0, 1), adaptive expectations
dynamics never disappears. Repeated substitution of equation (3) with a constant learning gain
leads to the weighted least squares estimate for the coeﬃcients,
αˆit =
(
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτxt−τx′t−τ
)−1(
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτxt−τf it−τ
)
, (5)
where (1−γ)γτ is the weight given to an observation from τ periods in the past. Since the learning
gain is less than one, weights decline geometrically with the age of the observation. Common
estimates for the learning gain for quarterly observations are around 0.01− 0.02 (see, for example,
Milani (2007) or Slobodyan and Wouters (2012)). This is roughly consistent with agents estimating
regressions using a rolling window of between 50-100 observations, or about 12.5-25 years of quarterly
data.
Constant-gain learning is useful when market participants suspect that structural changes are
possible, but they are not endowed with a menu and probability set of possible structural changes.
Rather, agents put more weight on more recent observations that are more likely to represent the
current data generating process. This is likely the case with ﬁscal policy. Structural changes can
come from shifts in political power, shifts in the political value placed ﬁscal stimulus versus austerity,
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shifts in emphasis on using government spending versus taxes versus transfers, and changes in tax
laws, spending programs, or transfer programs.
Because the learning process is nonlinear, it introduces a source of time-varying volatility in
expectations and uncertainty, even in an otherwise linear model with constant-variance innovations.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the size and evolution of uncertainty implied by least-squares
learning, and measure the impact uncertainty concerning ﬁscal policy has on the macroeconomy.
3.2 Learning with Instrumental Variables
The set of explanatory variables in agents' regressions includes concurrent values for output, con-
sumption, investment, and unemployment, all of which are likely endogenous. Following Herro and
Murray (2013), I present here a modiﬁed learning algorithm that allows market participants to
account for endogeneity using instrumental variables (IV) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). Let
wt be the subset of variables in xt that are possibly endogenous, and vt be the remaining exogenous
variables so that xt = [v
′
t w
′
t]
′. The exogenous variables include the lagged ﬁscal policy variables and
the constant term. All the other explanatory variables are concurrent macroeconomic variables and
so they are possibly endogenous. Let zt denote a vector that includes instruments and exogenous
variables. I suppose market participants use as instruments two lags each of all the endogenous
variables and an additional two lags of each of the ﬁscal policy variables (the ﬁrst lag is already an
explanatory variable).
In the ﬁrst stage, market participants estimate the following relationship to determine how much
the endogenous variables can be explained only by instruments and exogenous variables,
wjt = z
′
tβ
j + ξjt , (6)
where superscript j denotes the jth endogenous variable in vector wt. The weighted least-squares
estimate for the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients is given by,
βˆjt =
(
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτzt−τz′t−τ
)−1(
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτzt−τw
j
t−τ
)
, (7)
and the predicted value for the endogenous vector is given by wˆjt = z
′
tβˆ
j
t .
Let xˆt = [v
′
t wˆ
′
t]
′ denote the explanatory variables used in the second stage regression, where
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endogenous variables in xt have been replaced with their predicted values from the ﬁrst stage
regression. The IV estimates for the coeﬃcients in the ﬁscal policy feedback rules are given by,
αˆi,IVt =
(
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτ xˆt−τ xˆ′t−τ
)−1(
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτ xˆt−τf it−τ
)
, (8)
where again the i superscript denotes the ith ﬁscal policy variable in vector ft. The 2SLS procedure
can be written in the following recursive form,
Stage 1:
βˆjt = βˆ
j
t−1 + γ
(
RS1t
)−1
zt−1
(
wjt−1 − z′t−1βˆjt−1
)
RS1t = R
S1
t−1 + γ
(
zt−1z′t−1 −RS1t−1
)
wˆjt = z
′
tβˆ
j
t , xˆt = [v
′
t wˆ
′
t]
′
Stage 2:
αˆi,IVt = αˆ
i,IV
t−1 + γ
(
RS2t
)−1
xˆt−1
(
f it−1 − xˆ′t−1αˆit−1
)
RS2t = R
S2
t−1 + γ
(
xˆt−1xˆ′t−1 −RS2t−1
)
.
(9)
The learning process requires initial conditions for coeﬃcient vectors βˆjt and αˆ
i,IV
t and cross-
product matrices RS1t and R
S2
t . To initialize these, I use a pre-sample of six years of quarterly
data immediately preceding the sample period and estimate the 2SLS regression with a-priori equal
weights on the observations.
3.3 Expectations and Uncertainty
At each period in time, market participants acquire a new observation from the previous time
period, re-estimate their regressions through period t − 1 using the 2SLS procedure above, and
ﬁnally evaluate how well they understand the conduct of ﬁscal policy by comparing actual ﬁscal
policy with the predicted values implied by their regressions. Market participants' time t expectation
for ﬁscal policy at time t is given by,
fˆ it = x
′
tαˆ
i,IV
t . (10)
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Notice that this predicted value is not a forecast from the previous time period, but an expectation
for concurrent ﬁscal policy informed by concurrent macroeconomic conditions (given in xt) and past
ﬁscal policy behavior (given in αˆi,IVt ). The unexpected component of ﬁscal policy is given by,
ˆit = f
i
t − fˆ it = f it − x′tαˆi,IVt , (11)
which is ﬁscal policy that is not explained by current economic conditions nor past ﬁscal policy
behavior. I measure ﬁscal policy uncertainty using a root mean squared aggregate of these residuals.
Speciﬁcally, I use a weighted root mean squared residual consistent with the constant-gain learning
algorithm presented above, which is given by,
mit =
√√√√(1− γ) t∑
τ=1
γτ (f it−τ − x′t−τ αˆi,IVt−τ )2. (12)
Because there is a regression model for each ﬁscal policy variable, i, including government spending,
taxes, transfers, and government debt, the procedure allows one to quantify uncertainty regarding
each type of ﬁscal policy. Finally, this measure of ﬁscal policy uncertainty is solely a measure of
uncertainty regarding ﬁscal policy, and does not conﬂate unexpected ﬁscal actions with unexpected
macroeconomic outcomes, because concurrent macroeconomic outcomes are taken into account to
form the expectation for the ﬁscal variables in equation (10).
3.4 Data
The sample period spans 1960:Q3 to 2013:Q2 using U.S. quarterly data. To set initial conditions for
the learning process, I use a pre-sample period from 1954:Q3 through 1960:Q2. The macroeconomic
variables include real GDP, real consumption expenditures, real private domestic investment, and
the civilian unemployment rate. Real GDP, consumption, and investment come from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis and are put in per-capita terms, and expressed as a ratio of real GDP per capita
from the previous quarter. The civilian unemployment rate is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and expressed as a percentage. The ﬁscal variables include government expenditures, tax revenue,
net transfers, and government debt. The ﬁrst three come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and government debt comes from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Financial Accounts of the
United States. The ﬁscal variables are also in real per-capita terms and expressed as a ratio of the
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GDP per capita from the previous quarter. Government expenditures is government consumption
plus government investment, and includes federal, state, and local governments. Tax revenue is
government current tax receipts, which includes all levels of government and is put in real terms using
the GDP Implicit Price Deﬂator. Transfers are government current transfer payments, speciﬁcally
government social beneﬁts, and is also put into real terms using the GDP deﬂator. Government
debt is deﬁned as the sum of federal government debt securities and state and local government
credit market instruments, excluding employee retirement funds. Government debt is put into real
terms using the GDP deﬂator.
3.5 Expectations and Uncertainty
Figure 1 shows plots of the actual ﬁscal policy variables (solid line) and the associated least-squares
expectations (dashed line) for each ﬁscal policy variable with a learning gain equal to 0.02. Constant
gain least-squares leads to underestimates for all of the ﬁscal policy variables over most of the sample.
Figure 2 shows plots of the prediction error. For government spending and tax revenues, constant
gain least-squares underestimates actual ﬁscal policy by about 1% to 2% of real GDP over much of
the sample period, with larger prediction errors occurring after 1990. Transfers are underestimated
by about 0% to 1% of real GDP in the ﬁrst 30 years of the sample, and between 1% and 2% of
real GDP since 1990, with spikes of 2.5% and over 5% of real GDP occurring in 2001 and 2008.
Government debt is underestimated by about 0% to 5% of real GDP from 1960-1990, then the
prediction error grows to between 5% and 15% of real GDP afterwards. There is another seemingly
permanent climb in the average prediction error for government debt in 2000. There is a large
spike in all of the estimated residuals at the onset of the great recession in 2008. Note that since
the least-squares learning regression models condition on concurrent macroeconomic variables, the
residuals reﬂect unexpected ﬁscal responses, and not unexpected macroeconomic conditions.
Figure 3 shows plots of ﬁscal policy uncertainty. The ﬁgure shows that the buildups of prediction
errors associated with the economic expansion from 1991 through 2001 led to a steady increase in
ﬁscal policy uncertainty leading up to the 2001 recession. Fiscal policy uncertainty comes down
quickly following the recession, but climbs during the years prior to the great recession, reaching
record or near-record levels at the onset of the recession. The record levels of ﬁscal policy uncertainty
during the great recession reach near 7% of real GDP for government expenditures, near 6% of real
GDP for tax revenue, near 7% of real GDP for transfers, and nearly 35% of real GDP for government
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debt.
The evolution for expectations and uncertainty with alternative calibrations for the learning
gain are discussed in the Appendix and presented in Figures A1 through A6. The quantities for the
prediction errors and the degree of ﬁscal uncertainty vary somewhat, but the above descriptions for
the direction and timing of the movements largely holds for alternative learning gains.
3.6 Common Component
The plots in Figure 3 reveal that the dynamic behavior of uncertainty for all of the ﬁscal policy
variables is very similar. Panel (a) of Table 1 shows the correlation between each pair of ﬁscal
uncertainty variables when the learning gain is equal to 0.02.3 The strong positive co-movement of
all the ﬁscal uncertainty variables suggests that there may be a latent common factor underlying
unpredictable ﬁscal policy. I construct a measure for the common component to ﬁscal uncertainty by
estimating a coincident indicator for all of the four ﬁscal policy variables, using a dynamic common
factor model like that used by Stock and Watson (1989). I decompose each ﬁscal policy uncertainty
variable into common and unique components and use these in the next section to measure the
general eﬀect of ﬁscal policy uncertainty as well as unique eﬀects from uncertainty on each ﬁscal
variable.4
Let λt be a scalar coincident indicator representing the common component of ﬁscal policy
uncertainty. Suppose ﬁscal policy uncertainty evolves according to the following state-space system:
mt = m0 +Aλt + et (13)
λt = b1λt−1 + b2λt−2 + υt, V ar(υt) = σ2υ (14)
et = Cet−1 + ηt, V ar(ηt) = Q. (15)
Equation (13) is the measurement equation, where mt is the vector of ﬁscal policy uncertainty
variables, m0 is a vector which inﬂuences the mean of each type of uncertainty, and A is a vector
where each element captures the proportion to which the ﬁscal uncertainty variable depends on the
3Results for ﬁscal uncertainty measures constructed from learning gains alternatively calibrated to 0.01 and 0.04
are reported and discussed in the Appendix. The magnitudes for the correlation coeﬃcients are similar and the
qualitative ﬁnding is the same.
4The use the word unique is not meant to imply these measures are orthogonal to each other. The dynamic
common factor model identiﬁes a single common factor with an autoregressive structure, and each unique component
is identiﬁed by subtracting a proportion of the common factor from the associated ﬁscal uncertainty variable.
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common component. Equation (14) is the state equation with speciﬁes the evolution for the latent
common factor. Here I allow ﬁscal uncertainty to follow an AR(2) process with constant variance.
The stochastic term in the measurement equation is allowed to follow the AR(1) process speciﬁed
in equation (15), where the autoregressive matrix, C, and the variance matrix, Q, are both diagonal
matrices. The innovation to the common factor, υt, and the innovations to the unique components
of ﬁscal uncertainty, ηt, are all independent.
I estimate equations (13) through (15) by maximum likelihood and obtain smoothed estimates for
the series λt and et. Plots of the coincident indicator for ﬁscal uncertainty are shown in Figure 4 for
learning gains equal to 0.01, 0.02 and 0.04. Again, the ﬁgure suggests relatively low ﬁscal uncertainty
from 1960 through the middle to late 1980s. There is a buildup of ﬁscal policy uncertainty beginning
in the late 1980s or early 1990s, reaching peaks just preceding the recessions beginning in 2001 and
2007. The diﬀerent learning gains tell mostly the same qualitative story, but diﬀer somewhat in
magnitude. The largest magnitude for ﬁscal uncertainty is predicted by the expectations framework
with the lowest learning gain, which is expected. Agents that use a smaller learning gain adjust
their expectations more slowly in response to unexpected ﬁscal policy actions. If these ﬁscal policy
actions have persistence, they continue to be unexpected until agents learn the new behavior.
Figure 5 shows plots of the unique component of each ﬁscal uncertainty variable with a learning
gain equal to 0.02. Relative uncertainty on government spending has declined over time. Relative
uncertainty on taxes increased while tax revenue was increasing during the 1990s, but has fallen
oﬀ since then. The opposite can be said of relative uncertainty regarding government debt. Here
there was a decline during the 1990s when debt relative to real GDP was falling, but the relative
uncertainty concerning government debt increased after 2000 and has remained high while at the
same time the level of debt to GDP was rising and has remained high. Transfers uncertainty closely
follows the coincident ﬁscal uncertainty measure. It can be seen that the common component
of ﬁscal uncertainty in Figure 4 (when the learning gain is equal to 0.02) very closely resembles
the original plot for transfers uncertainty in Figure 3. As a consequence, the unique component
for transfers is reduced to what appears to be a nearly independently and identically distributed
stochastic process.
The evolution for the unique components of ﬁscal uncertainty under alternative learning gains
are discussed in the appendix and shown in Figures A7 and A8. Again, while the magnitudes for
ﬁscal uncertainty diﬀer across diﬀerent learning gains, the direction and timing of the movements
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are all very similar.
Panel (b) of Table 1 shows the correlations of the unique components with each other. Comparing
panels (a) and (b) reveals that removing the common component of ﬁscal policy uncertainty leads
to much lower correlation between each pair of ﬁscal variables. Panel (c) of Table 1 shows how
strongly correlated each unadjusted ﬁscal uncertainty variable is to the common component of ﬁscal
uncertainty. The correlations range from 0.75 to 0.99, indicating that all of the ﬁscal uncertainty
variables are strongly correlated with the common component. I repeat the exercise in this section
with ﬁscal uncertainty variables constructed with alternative calibrations for the learning gain, and
report the correlations in Tables A1 and A2. The magnitudes for the correlations diﬀer only slightly
with diﬀerent learning gains.
The coincident indicator for ﬁscal uncertainty is similar in its purpose and meaning as the
policy uncertainty index constructed by Baker et al. (2013) (henceforth BBD index). These authors
construct an index of policy uncertainty that includes monetary and ﬁscal policy, and which is
based on three factors: frequency of major newspaper headlines on the subject of policy uncertainty,
number of existing tax policies that are soon due to expire, and the variance of professional forecasts
for policy variables. While the coincident indicator for ﬁscal uncertainty in the present paper diﬀers
signiﬁcantly in its methodology from the BBD index, the measures are positively correlated; though
the strength of the correlation depends on the learning gain. Figure 6 shows plots that compare
the BBD index (dotted line) with the common component for ﬁscal uncertainty (solid line) over the
period 1985 through 2013, the period in which the BBD index is available. The ﬁgure includes the
estimated common component constructed for three diﬀerent learning gains, including 0.01, 0.02,
and 0.04. The coincident indicators are re-scaled from what is shown in Figure 4 to match the
scaling procedure that was used to construct the BBD index. The coincident index is multiplied
by a constant proportion so that the variance of the coincident index matches the variance of BBD
over the sub-sample 1985 - 2009, and a constant is added so that mean of the coincident index is
equal to 100.0 over the same sub-sample.
The correlation of each coincident indicator with the BBD index are also reported in Figure
6. The correlations are positive, but small, and are the largest with the smaller, more empirically
plausible, learning gains. The largest correlation is 0.27 with a learning gain equal to 0.01 and
the smallest correlation is 0.06 with a learning gain equal to 0.04. While there appears to be
little relationship in the time series in the ﬁrst half of the sample, the measures move more closely
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together over the last ﬁfteen years of the sample. There is a buildup of policy uncertainty beginning
near 2000 which persists for a couple of years beyond the 2001 recession before coming back down.
Another larger buildup of ﬁscal uncertainty begins before the onset of the 2007-2009 recession and
eventually comes back down by the end of the sample.
While the BBD index and the coincident index for ﬁscal uncertainty in the present paper are
similar in their purposes and meaning, there are a number of reasons to expect these measures may
not be highly correlated. First, the BBD index is more likely endogenously determined with the
health of the macroeconomy, given that ﬁscal policy is more likely to make headline news when the
economy is suﬀering from a recessionary gap. The common component of ﬁscal uncertainty is less
likely susceptible to this problem because the predicted values for ﬁscal variables use concurrent
macroeconomic conditions among its explanatory variables. The prediction errors from the regres-
sion that make up the measure for ﬁscal uncertainty are therefore not likely related to concurrent
economic conditions.5 Secondly, the BBD index includes a forward-looking aspect while the coinci-
dent index for ﬁscal uncertainty is purely backward looking. The BBD index includes incorporates
information on the number of tax laws that are due to expire. The ﬁscal uncertainty measures
constructed in this paper would only pick up this information after the expiration of the policy, and
only insomuch that the expiration of the tax policy alters the aggregate behavior tax revenues or
net transfers.
4 Macroeconomic Impact of Fiscal Uncertainty
I now turn to estimating the eﬀect that ﬁscal policy uncertainty has on the macroeconomy. I
estimate an autoregressive distributed lag models (ARDL) for several macroeconomic outcome vari-
ables, including real GDP, consumption, investment, employment, unemployment, and inﬂation,
and include as explanatory variables the measures of ﬁscal policy uncertainty constructed in the
previous section. As above, the quantity variables real GDP, consumption, and investment are put
in per-capita terms, and expressed as a ratio of the previous quarter's real GDP per capita. Em-
ployment is given by the total number of employed persons from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It
is also put in per-capita terms, and so is the employment to population ratio. Unemployment is the
5The coincident index for ﬁscal uncertainty is still possibly endogenously determined with macroeconomic out-
comes, if structural changes in the ﬁscal policy rules endogenously depend on economic conditions. In such a case,
the structural change leads to a larger prediction error, and therefore a larger degree of ﬁscal uncertainty.
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civilian unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, inﬂation is the annualized
quarterly growth rate of the GDP Implicit Price Deﬂator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
4.1 Regression Model
Let st denote the vector of macroeconomic variables above, and s
i
t denote the time t realization of
one of variables of the vector. The ARDL model to be estimated is given by,
sit = Ψ(L)st + Φ(L)f˜t + Γm˜t−1 + ψλt−1 + ξt. (16)
Here, Ψ(L) is a distributed lag operator denoting the set of coeﬃcient vectors for each lag of the
macroeconomic controls. The vector f˜t denotes a subset of the ﬁscal policy variables in ft from the
previous section, namely government expenditures, tax revenue, and net transfers. The operator
Φ(L) is a distributed lag operator for the set of coeﬃcients on each of these ﬁscal policy variables.
I assume identical lag lengths for Ψ(L) and Φ(L). The vector m˜t−1 denotes the unique components
of ﬁscal policy uncertainty at time t− 1 and Γ is the associated vector of coeﬃcients. The variable
λt−1 is the common component of ﬁscal uncertainty and ψ is the associated coeﬃcient. Finally, ξt
denotes the error term.
This set of ARDL equations is rich in explanatory variables. The purpose for this is to estimate
the channel for which ﬁscal uncertainty may inﬂuence the macroeconomy, while allowing for complex
macroeconomic dynamics. This includes allowing ﬁscal policy to directly inﬂuence the macroecon-
omy with the inclusion of Φ(L)f˜t, and allowing the six macroeconomic variables to inﬂuence each
other over time with the inclusion of Ψ(L)st. I estimate the ARDL model for the six macroeco-
nomic variables above, with diﬀerent lengths. Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the regression results when
uncertainty is computed using a learning gain equal to 0.02 and using distributed lag lengths equal
to 1, 2, and 4, respectively. The top part of the tables report the estimated coeﬃcients on the ﬁscal
uncertainty variables and their standard errors (Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
robust). With every lag speciﬁcation, the results show that the common component of ﬁscal policy
uncertainty leads to statistically signiﬁcant decreases in real GDP, consumption, and investment.
The coeﬃcient on inﬂation is also negative and statistically signiﬁcant in each speciﬁcation, indicat-
ing that ﬁscal uncertainty leads to a decrease in inﬂation. This is contrary to the theoretical ﬁnding
by Fernández-Villiverde et al. (2011a), who use a calibrated New Keynesian business cycle model
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to demonstrate that ﬁscal uncertainty can have stagﬂationary eﬀects. Rather, it appears that ﬁs-
cal uncertainty causes a drag on aggregate demand that pushes consumption spending, investment
spending, real GDP, and the rate of inﬂation downward.
The coeﬃcient on unemployment rate is negative in each case, but only statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level in one speciﬁcation and the coeﬃcient on the employment / population ratio is
positive, but never statistically signiﬁcant. This could be due to a labor supply eﬀect. Recall that
the common component for ﬁscal uncertainty is nearly perfectly correlated with the unadjusted
estimate for government transfers uncertainty. Greater uncertainty on future payouts, possibly
from social welfare programs such as unemployment insurance or nutritional assistance programs,
may lead unemployed people to put forward more eﬀort into obtaining employment. Farber and
Valletta (2013) ﬁnd some limited statistical evidence in support of such a theory. They ﬁnd that
the unemployment rate and the average unemployment duration both increase in response to an
extension of unemployment beneﬁts, which can be viewed as a decrease in uncertainty, but the
magnitudes that they ﬁnd are small. Moreover, they attribute most of this increase in unemployment
not to a reduction in the job-ﬁnding rate, but a reduction in the labor-supply exit rate.
The coeﬃcients reveal another robust ﬁnding that uncertainty regarding tax revenue, speciﬁcally,
leads to statistically signiﬁcant increases in investment and real GDP. Born and Pfeifer (2011) oﬀer
competing explanations for opposing eﬀects that policy uncertainty can have on investment. In
one case, subject to greater uncertainty, investment decisions are postponed until times are more
certain, therefore depressing investment. On the other hand, ﬁrms that are risk averse self insure
in the presence of greater uncertainty by building up a buﬀer capital stock. Also, consumers that
are risk averse supply more labor when subject to greater uncertainty. The increase in employment
leads to an increase in the marginal product of capital, which also boosts investment demand.
The empirical results in the present paper suggest the latter eﬀect dominates when it comes to
uncertainty speciﬁcally concerning taxes. Subject to general ﬁscal uncertainty, the former eﬀect
dominates.
Given there are ﬁve ﬁscal uncertainty variables in the empirical model, I estimate a joint Wald
test with the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on all the ﬁscal uncertainty coeﬃcients are equal
to zero. In nearly every case, the test is strongly rejected. Therefore uncertainty regarding one
or more ﬁscal policy variables does indeed have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on a number of
macroeconomic outcomes. An exception is the regression on inﬂation, which is not statistically
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signiﬁcant at the longer lag lengths, and it is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level with lag length
equal to one quarter. Also, at lag length equal to four quarters, the joint Wald is not statistically
signiﬁcant for consumption and employment, likely due to diminished degrees of freedom (given the
long lag length on numerous controls, these regressions contain 41 explanatory variables).
Rather than reporting the estimated coeﬃcients for the long list of controls, each with multiple
lags, Tables 2, 3, and 4 report joint Wald statistics for each set of controls. The null hypothesis
for a given control variable is that the coeﬃcients on all the lags of that variable are equal to zero.
Many of these are statistically signiﬁcant, so it is likely important to include these macroeconomic
and ﬁscal policy control variables to account for complex macroeconomic dynamics and dependence
while ﬁnding evidence for the impact of ﬁscal uncertainty.
To check for robustness, in the appendix I repeat this regression analysis using ﬁscal uncertainty
constructed from alternative calibrations for the learning gain.
4.2 Magnitude of the Impact
The magnitude of the regression coeﬃcients may suggest that ﬁscal uncertainty is not a quanti-
tatively important driver of business cycles. Take, for example, the regression coeﬃcients on the
common component of ﬁscal uncertainty in the ARDL regression with two lags (Table 3). The
common component for ﬁscal uncertainty is an index with a standard deviation normalized to 1.0.
The regression coeﬃcient for real GDP is statistically signiﬁcantly negative, and equal to -0.41,
which implies a one-standard deviation increase in the common component of ﬁscal uncertainty
leads to a 0.4% decline in real GDP. While this magnitude is not negligible, it may not appear to be
evidence that ﬁscal uncertainty is a primary driver of business cycles or a leading factor explaining
the Great Recession or subsequent slow recovery. Fernández-Villiverde et al. (2011a) suggest that
while normal ﬂuctuations in policy uncertainty may not be quantitatively important for macroeco-
nomic dynamics, the once-in-a-decade spike in policy uncertainty should be of concern. Baker et al.
(2013) also speak to the quantitative importance of a long-horizon buildup of policy uncertainty,
ﬁnding that the growth policy uncertainty from 2006 to 2011 was associated with a 2.5% decline in
industrial production and a 2.3 million person decline in total employment.
I provide some statistics in Table 5 that speak to the macroeconomic impact that a decade-
long buildup of ﬁscal uncertainty can have. With every learning gain, the common component of
ﬁscal uncertainty reaches its highest point in the sample in the second quarter of 2009, the last
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quarter of the Great Recession according to NBER oﬃcial recession dating. I search the preceding
10 years and ﬁnd the lowest value that the common component of ﬁscal uncertainty took during
that time. For ﬁscal uncertainty computed using a learning gain equal to 0.02, this occurred in
the fourth quarter of 2005. I take the diﬀerence between these highest and lowest values, and
multiply this by the ARDL coeﬃcient on the common component of ﬁscal uncertainty to determine
the magnitude that a large and long buildup of ﬁscal uncertainty can have on the macroeconomy.
Panels (b), (c) and (d) in Table 5 report again the coeﬃcients on the common component from the
previous tables, the point estimates for the eﬀects on the dependent variables from a large buildup
in the common component of ﬁscal uncertainty, and a 95% conﬁdence interval of these eﬀects,
for ARDL speciﬁcations with 1, 2, and 4 lags, respectively. The results for each lag speciﬁcation
are quantitatively similar. The conﬁdence intervals indicate that the buildup of ﬁscal uncertainty
from late 2005 to mid 2009 led to a 1% to 3% decline in real GDP, which is in line with estimate
by Baker et al. (2013). A decline in consumption up to 1.5% of lagged real GDP, and a decline
in investment up to 2% of lagged real GDP. In the appendix, I provide some further discussion
using ﬁscal uncertainty measures constructed using alternative learning gains. In most cases, the
magnitudes and evidence for statistical signiﬁcant are similar.
5 Conclusion
Supposing that market participants form expectations on the behavior of ﬁscal policy by estimating
simple regressions, I compute and describe the implied paths for ﬁscal uncertainty for four policy
variables including government expenditures, taxes, transfers, and government debt. From these
measures, I compute a coincident indicator which provides a measure for a common component of
ﬁscal policy uncertainty. Using these measures of ﬁscal uncertainty in autoregressive distributed lag
models, I demonstrate the macroeconomic consequences for ﬁscal uncertainty includes lower real
GDP, consumption, and investment. For the buildup of ﬁscal uncertainty that occurred in the years
leading to the Great Recession, the magnitude of the impact on real GDP is sizable enough to help
explain the severity of the Great Recession and subsequent slow recovery.
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Table 1: Fiscal Policy Uncertainty Correlations (Learning Gain = 0.02)
(a) Fiscal Uncertainty Deﬁned as Root Weighted Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Gov Spending 1.00 - - -
Tax Revenue 0.75 1.00 - -
Transfers 0.74 0.78 1.00 -
Government Debt 0.64 0.65 0.90 1.00
(b) Fiscal Uncertainty with Common Component Removed
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Gov Spending 1.00 - - -
Tax Revenue 0.40 1.00 - -
Transfers -0.17 -0.23 1.00 -
Government Debt -0.21 -0.32 -0.18 1.00
(c) Correlation of RMSE with Coincident Index
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Coincident Index 0.75 0.78 0.99 0.91
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Table 2: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.02, Lag Length = 1
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.04 0.10 −0.10 −0.72 0.41*** 0.01
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.89) (0.16) (0.21)
Tax Receipts 0.32*** 0.03 0.32*** 0.26 −0.08 0.03
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.25) (0.13) (0.14)
Transfer Payments 0.11** 0.00 0.08** −0.25 −0.01 0.08
(Standard Error) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.53) (0.06) (0.12)
Government Debt 0.06 −0.06 0.13* −1.09* 0.23 0.21
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.65) (0.18) (0.15)
Coincident Index −0.43*** −0.22*** −0.25*** 0.36 −0.34*** −0.28***
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (1.17) (0.11) (0.10)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 5.64*** 6.52*** 5.90*** 3.04** 5.28*** 2.11*
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 17.19*** 24.59*** 8.82*** 0.10 9.57*** 7.29***
Consumption 8.95*** 183.81*** 0.71 0.03 1.43 0.45
Investment 0.67 465.17*** 5.06** 0.03 0.42 1.02
Employment 13.09*** 0.37 122.86*** 0.78 8.50*** 1.60
Unemployment 7.06*** 18.63*** 3.29* 0.22 2.80* 82.94***
Inﬂation 6.50** 0.00 8.83*** 0.03 0.23 1.30
Government Expenditures 1.34 11.85*** 2.42 0.08 7.07*** 0.14
Transfer Payments 4.12** 1.18 2.83* 0.19 4.41** 0.24
Tax Receipts 10.21*** 11.66*** 16.57*** 0.15 12.19*** 12.32***
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.25 0.98 0.95 0.82 0.84 0.80
AIC 480.01 193.75 294.88 675.85 427.47 637.55
BIC 533.56 247.30 348.43 729.40 481.03 691.10
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,195).
3. Null hypothesis: All 1 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(1,195).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table 3: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.02, Lag Length = 2
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.04 0.06 −0.06 −0.68** 0.55*** 0.02
(Standard Error) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.28) (0.13) (0.25)
Tax Receipts 0.36*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.39 −0.22 0.05
(Standard Error) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.28) (0.14) (0.15)
Transfer Payments −0.01 −0.03 0.01 −0.49** 0.19*** 0.01
(Standard Error) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.23) (0.06) (0.12)
Government Debt 0.05 −0.03 0.09 −1.27 0.25 0.12
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.88) (0.16) (0.17)
Coincident Index −0.41*** −0.21*** −0.19*** 0.13 −0.22* −0.36**
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.38) (0.14) (0.16)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 4.02*** 3.80*** 2.54** 3.21*** 4.27*** 1.29
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 8.90*** 13.45*** 5.34*** 1.53 5.33*** 5.75***
Consumption 16.58*** 39.94*** 10.03*** 0.46 1.67 0.35
Investment 9.51*** 212.55*** 14.30*** 0.30 0.61 1.16
Employment 11.97*** 1.71 62.87*** 0.91 5.54*** 1.39
Unemployment 2.98* 7.02*** 2.13 0.43 0.96 34.67***
Inﬂation 4.87*** 0.71 3.93** 1.27 3.71** 0.69
Government Expenditures 5.41*** 6.32*** 2.05 4.51** 10.25*** 0.85
Transfer Payments 4.19** 1.09 2.30 1.11 3.34** 0.57
Tax Receipts 3.69** 4.16** 5.29*** 0.87 4.45** 5.30***
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.32 0.98 0.96 0.83 0.87 0.81
AIC 466.15 198.35 257.72 666.99 398.54 632.69
BIC 549.83 282.03 341.40 750.67 482.22 716.37
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,186).
3. Null hypothesis: All 2 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(2,186).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table 4: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.02, Lag Length = 4
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.13 0.03 −0.08 −0.58 0.47*** 0.09
(Standard Error) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.39) (0.13) (0.23)
Tax Receipts 0.43*** 0.03 0.30*** 0.35 −0.17 0.02
(Standard Error) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.38) (0.13) (0.20)
Transfer Payments −0.01 −0.04 0.02 −0.45*** 0.18*** 0.04
(Standard Error) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.05) (0.12)
Government Debt 0.15 −0.01 0.15*** −1.20 0.26* 0.03
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.95) (0.15) (0.19)
Coincident Index −0.40*** −0.12* −0.21*** 0.04 −0.21 −0.47*
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.41) (0.15) (0.24)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 4.44*** 1.06 4.86*** 1.65 5.54*** 1.53
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 8.89*** 4.71*** 12.48*** 1.03 4.20*** 1.92
Consumption 3.32** 18.01*** 4.36*** 0.36 2.08* 2.31*
Investment 5.19*** 87.23*** 5.04*** 0.18 0.53 3.74***
Employment 6.17*** 0.30 35.01*** 0.87 3.82*** 1.39
Unemployment 3.23** 2.37* 2.45** 0.45 0.17 13.35***
Inﬂation 3.49*** 0.65 4.61*** 2.01* 6.20*** 0.41
Government Expenditures 4.25*** 2.20* 1.43 2.54** 7.00*** 3.67***
Transfer Payments 4.91*** 1.30 3.77*** 0.45 1.74 1.15
Tax Receipts 4.15*** 1.54 6.33*** 0.48 2.88** 2.59**
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.39 0.98 0.96 0.84 0.89 0.82
AIC 459.08 203.62 254.38 679.46 378.98 631.62
BIC 603.00 347.55 398.30 823.38 522.91 775.55
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,168).
3. Null hypothesis: All 4 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(4,168).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table 5: Impact from an Extreme Decade of Fiscal Uncertainty
(a) Magnitude of Extreme Change in Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty (Learning Gain = 0.02)
Largest Value Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty = 4.77 Date: 2009 Quarter 2
Smallest Value in Decade Preceding = -0.34 Date: 2005 Quarter 4
(b) Estimates using ARDL with 1 Lag
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.43*** −2.19 −3.22 −1.15
Consumption −0.22*** −1.12 −1.57 −0.68
Investment −0.25*** −1.26 −2.09 −0.43
Employment 0.36 1.86 −9.87 13.59
Unemployment −0.34*** −1.73 −2.83 −0.64
Inﬂation −0.28*** −1.43 −2.46 −0.39
(c) Estimates using ARDL with 2 Lags
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.41*** −2.07 −3.04 −1.11
Consumption −0.21*** −1.06 −1.57 −0.54
Investment −0.19*** −0.96 −1.64 −0.29
Employment 0.13 0.65 −3.15 4.45
Unemployment −0.22* −1.14 −2.49 0.21
Inﬂation −0.36** −1.85 −3.50 −0.20
(d) Estimates using ARDL with 4 Lags
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.40*** −2.07 −3.08 −1.05
Consumption −0.12* −0.60 −1.24 0.03
Investment −0.21*** −1.06 −1.69 −0.43
Employment 0.04 0.19 −3.95 4.32
Unemployment −0.21 −1.09 −2.57 0.38
Inﬂation −0.47* −2.40 −4.82 0.02
* P-value < 0.10, ** P-value < 0.05, *** P-value < 0.01
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Figure 1: Least-Squares Learning Predictions
Learning Gain = 0.02
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Figure 2: Least-Squares Learning Prediction Errors
Learning Gain = 0.02
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Figure 3: Fiscal Policy Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.02
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Figure 4: Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.01 Learning Gain = 0.02
Learning Gain = 0.04
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Figure 5: Unique Components of Fiscal Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.02
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Figure 6: Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty with Baker et. al. (2013) Policy Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.01 Learning Gain = 0.02
Learning Gain = 0.04
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A Appendix
Here I explore how robust the ﬁndings in the paper are to alternative calibrations for the learning
gain equal to 0.01 and 0.04. The main content of this paper uses 0.02 as a learning gain, which
is consistent with tightly estimated values in Milani (2007) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2012).
The larger is the learning gain, the more weight is given to recent observations relative to older
observations. A larger learning gain leads to faster learning subject to a structural change in the data
generating process, but it also subjects market participants to greater swings in expectations when
subject to independent stochastic shocks, something that would not alter rational expectations.
A.1 Expectations and Uncertainty
In Section 3.6, I construct market participants expectations and degrees of uncertainty using a
learning gain equal to 0.02. Here, I construct these measures again, using learning gains equal
0.01 and 0.04. Figures A1 and A2 show the paths of expectations for each ﬁscal variable and the
prediction errors using a learning gain equal to 0.01. Figure A3 shows the path for ﬁscal uncertainty
based on the mean squared prediction error. This exercise is repeated for a learning gain equal to
0.04 if Figures A4, A5, and A6. While the magnitudes for the forecast errors and ﬁscal uncertainty
diﬀer between these learning gains, and diﬀer from the magnitudes using a learning gain equal to
0.02 (Figures 2, and 3 discussed in the main part of the paper), the timing and direction of the
movements in these variables are similar. The diﬀerence in magnitude is to be expected. Larger
is the learning gains lead to greater swings in expectations, which lead to larger degrees of ﬁscal
uncertainty. The timing for the movements in ﬁscal uncertainty diﬀer somewhat. Because the
larger learning gains lead to faster learning, for a learning gain equal to 0.04, the degree of ﬁscal
uncertainty drops back to normal levels more quickly following spikes or buildups, as compared to
learning gains equal to 0.01 or 0.02.
A.2 Common Component of Fiscal Uncertainty
Using a learning gain equal to 0.02, I show in Section 3.6 that the resulting measures for uncertainty
for the ﬁscal variables are highly correlated. Panel (a) in each Table A1 and ?? conﬁrm that this
is also true when using learning gains equal to 0.01 and 0.04, respectively. I estimate again the
common component using the coincident indicator method described in Section 3.6, and when the
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common component is removed from the ﬁscal uncertainty variables, again they are much less
strongly correlated, as panel (b) in each table reveals. Finally, panel (c) in these tables reveals that
the common component is highly correlated with all of the unadjusted ﬁscal uncertainty variables.
Figures A7 and A8 show the paths for the unique components of ﬁscal uncertainty for learning gains
0.01 and 0.04, respectively.
A.3 Regression Results and Impact
Tables A3, A4, and A5 show the ARDL model results for lag lengths equal to 1, 2, and 4, respectively,
when using ﬁscal uncertainty measures constructed from a learning gain equal to 0.01. The exercise
is repeated for a learning gain equal to 0.04 in Tables A6, A7, and A8. In most cases, the signs and
magnitudes on the regression coeﬃcients on the common component of ﬁscal uncertainty are similar,
and statistical signiﬁcance appears in many of the same cases. The largest exception is the ARDL
model with lag length equal to four quarters and a learning gain equal to 0.04. In this case there
is little statistical evidence that the common component of ﬁscal uncertainty has macroeconomic
eﬀects. This lack of robustness is not very troubling, as that learning gain is arguably farthest
from what is empirically plausible. Also, the model may suﬀer from too few degrees of freedom, as
the ARDL with four lags on nine control variables leads to a model with 41 explanatory variables,
including the ﬁve ﬁscal uncertainty variables.
Finally, Tables A9 and A10 show the estimated impact of the long-term extreme buildup of ﬁscal
uncertainty that occurred during the Great Recession and the decade preceding it, using a learning
gain equal to 0.01 and 0.04, respectively. The estimates are similar to that using a learning gain
equal to 0.02, which is discussed in Section 4.2 and presented in Table 5. The only exception again
are the results using a learning gain equal to 0.04 and lag length equal to four quarters, where the
estimated eﬀects are smaller, and are not precisely estimated.
Fiscal Policy Uncertainty and Its Macroeconomic Consequences 34
Table A1: Fiscal Policy Uncertainty Correlations (Learning Gain = 0.01)
(a) Fiscal Uncertainty Deﬁned as Root Weighted Mean Squared Error
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Gov Spending 1.00 - - -
Tax Revenue 0.44 1.00 - -
Transfers 0.40 0.62 1.00 -
Government Debt 0.28 0.38 0.82 1.00
(b) Fiscal Uncertainty with Common Component Removed
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Gov Spending 1.00 - - -
Tax Revenue 0.24 1.00 - -
Transfers -0.12 -0.14 1.00 -
Government Debt -0.32 -0.35 -0.12 1.00
(c) Correlation of RMSE with Coincident Index
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Coincident Index 0.41 0.64 0.99 0.84
Table A2: Fiscal Policy Uncertainty Correlations (Learning Gain = 0.04)
(a) Fiscal Uncertainty Deﬁned as Root Weighted Mean Squared Error
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Gov Spending 1.00 - - -
Tax Revenue 0.84 1.00 - -
Transfers 0.79 0.79 1.00 -
Government Debt 0.77 0.76 0.93 1.00
(b) Fiscal Uncertainty with Common Component Removed
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Gov Spending 1.00 - - -
Tax Revenue 0.48 1.00 - -
Transfers -0.23 -0.25 1.00 -
Government Debt 0.04 -0.02 -0.24 1.00
(c) Correlation of RMSE with Coincident Index
Gov Spending Tax Revenue Transfers Government Debt
Coincident Index 0.80 0.81 0.99 0.94
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Table A3: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.01, Lag Length = 1
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.05 0.12* −0.15*** 0.01 0.24 −0.21
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.56) (0.18) (0.20)
Tax Receipts 0.20** 0.05 0.22*** 0.38 −0.15 −0.04
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.37) (0.13) (0.14)
Transfer Payments 0.12*** 0.03 0.07** −0.20 −0.03 0.11
(Standard Error) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.27) (0.05) (0.11)
Government Debt 0.05 0.00 0.14** −1.74*** 0.42** 0.57***
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.42) (0.19) (0.18)
Coincident Index −0.43*** −0.20*** −0.29*** −0.03 −0.15 −0.21**
(Standard Error) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.73) (0.12) (0.10)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 4.51*** 4.17*** 6.44*** 6.32*** 4.16*** 2.89**
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 15.31*** 14.94*** 10.47*** 0.00 1.54 4.00**
Consumption 4.73** 170.61*** 0.17 0.34 1.79 0.73
Investment 2.61 448.44*** 7.98*** 0.53 0.03 0.25
Employment 6.68** 1.47 141.10*** 2.15 7.98*** 1.31
Unemployment 2.64 9.04*** 1.26 0.17 2.94* 75.12***
Inﬂation 1.51 0.23 2.85* 0.20 0.09 0.92
Government Expenditures 0.94 8.10*** 1.98 0.11 6.28** 0.06
Transfer Payments 0.87 1.19 0.26 1.12 3.46* 1.20
Tax Receipts 3.62* 9.05*** 7.19*** 0.75 14.24*** 15.29***
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.24 0.98 0.95 0.85 0.84 0.80
AIC 482.91 197.37 296.71 641.71 437.26 628.15
BIC 536.46 250.93 350.26 695.27 490.81 681.70
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,195).
3. Null hypothesis: All 1 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(1,195).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table A4: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.01, Lag Length = 2
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures 0.01 0.10 −0.09* 0.22 0.23 −0.22
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.23) (0.14) (0.20)
Tax Receipts 0.20** 0.05 0.19*** 0.31 −0.18 −0.01
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.52) (0.11) (0.13)
Transfer Payments 0.10 0.02 0.07** −0.36 0.16** 0.03
(Standard Error) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.52) (0.06) (0.11)
Government Debt −0.02 0.00 0.09* −2.02** 0.50*** 0.55***
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.90) (0.19) (0.19)
Coincident Index −0.32*** −0.16*** −0.19*** −0.21 −0.05 −0.23
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.54) (0.12) (0.15)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 3.76*** 2.90** 4.76*** 6.49*** 2.80** 1.81
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 6.30*** 13.05*** 5.24*** 3.32** 2.35* 2.92*
Consumption 17.27*** 41.29*** 10.21*** 0.08 1.29 0.35
Investment 14.15*** 217.63*** 15.98*** 1.43 0.77 0.54
Employment 9.32*** 2.65* 71.00*** 1.58 6.45*** 1.35
Unemployment 0.35 1.85 1.06 0.10 1.40 39.73***
Inﬂation 2.80* 0.87 3.10** 1.72 3.56** 0.33
Government Expenditures 2.10 2.48* 1.45 1.00 12.05*** 0.23
Transfer Payments 1.15 1.04 1.13 0.25 2.32 0.97
Tax Receipts 0.56 2.37* 2.84* 4.98*** 4.71** 6.32***
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.31 0.98 0.96 0.87 0.86 0.81
AIC 469.36 201.14 256.11 615.46 412.23 627.47
BIC 553.04 284.82 339.78 699.14 495.91 711.15
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,186).
3. Null hypothesis: All 2 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(2,186).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table A5: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.01, Lag Length = 4
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.10 0.04 −0.11* 0.22 0.21 −0.10
(Standard Error) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.26) (0.16) (0.17)
Tax Receipts 0.25*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.28 −0.13 −0.09
(Standard Error) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.52) (0.10) (0.12)
Transfer Payments 0.08 0.00 0.08** −0.35 0.19*** 0.11
(Standard Error) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.63) (0.05) (0.12)
Government Debt 0.05 −0.01 0.16*** −1.82*** 0.42** 0.51**
(Standard Error) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.58) (0.17) (0.23)
Coincident Index −0.29*** −0.07 −0.21*** −0.39 0.02 −0.26
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (1.23) (0.14) (0.23)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 5.05*** 0.66 11.91*** 13.28*** 3.99*** 1.67
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 9.84*** 4.47*** 19.78*** 3.04** 2.79** 1.39
Consumption 3.24** 20.90*** 3.38** 0.28 1.10 2.85**
Investment 4.97*** 106.62*** 6.13*** 0.67 0.54 4.15***
Employment 4.37*** 0.41 35.45*** 1.34 3.77*** 2.04*
Unemployment 1.40 0.91 1.93 0.08 0.24 17.33***
Inﬂation 2.41* 0.73 3.49*** 2.12* 5.01*** 0.85
Government Expenditures 4.47*** 1.53 1.90 2.00* 5.66*** 2.62**
Transfer Payments 2.99** 1.23 3.78*** 0.17 0.79 1.09
Tax Receipts 1.14 1.09 5.15*** 3.18** 2.83** 2.99**
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.38 0.98 0.96 0.87 0.88 0.82
AIC 461.97 205.75 248.27 629.22 393.44 629.55
BIC 605.89 349.67 392.19 773.15 537.36 773.47
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,168).
3. Null hypothesis: All 4 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(4,168).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table A6: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.04, Lag Length = 1
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.04 0.03 −0.08 −0.58* 0.39*** −0.11
(Standard Error) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.34) (0.13) (0.16)
Tax Receipts 0.14 −0.01 0.16*** 0.19 0.01 0.11
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.30) (0.07) (0.10)
Transfer Payments 0.01 −0.03 0.01 −0.27* 0.11* 0.04
(Standard Error) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10)
Government Debt 0.11 0.00 0.09 −0.90*** 0.44*** −0.02
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) (0.13) (0.12)
Coincident Index −0.27*** −0.11*** −0.21*** 0.29** −0.29*** −0.20***
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 2.46** 1.88 5.89*** 2.28** 7.49*** 2.65**
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 8.86*** 7.16*** 14.84*** 5.35** 13.48*** 6.78***
Consumption 10.75*** 144.47*** 1.23 0.00 1.98 0.09
Investment 0.18 424.55*** 1.50 0.09 0.23 0.21
Employment 12.87*** 0.12 141.89*** 2.21 12.69*** 2.24
Unemployment 5.61** 12.21*** 2.83* 1.23 0.71 131.29***
Inﬂation 8.16*** 0.02 12.51*** 0.39 0.45 0.82
Government Expenditures 2.73 6.12** 2.75* 0.30 7.08*** 0.00
Transfer Payments 0.01 0.02 1.47 0.48 2.19 0.02
Tax Receipts 6.30** 4.34** 12.39*** 0.16 13.25*** 4.77**
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.98 0.94 0.80 0.86 0.79
AIC 491.75 206.34 302.86 702.15 400.26 639.73
BIC 545.31 259.90 356.41 755.70 453.82 693.28
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,195).
3. Null hypothesis: All 1 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(1,195).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
Fiscal Policy Uncertainty and Its Macroeconomic Consequences 39
Table A7: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.04, Lag Length = 2
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.12 −0.01 −0.08 −0.63 0.54*** −0.19
(Standard Error) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.49) (0.14) (0.18)
Tax Receipts 0.17 0.00 0.14* 0.34 −0.17 0.26**
(Standard Error) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.33) (0.10) (0.13)
Transfer Payments −0.11 −0.07* −0.05 −0.43** 0.27*** −0.05
(Standard Error) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.09)
Government Debt 0.16 0.03 0.09 −0.97** 0.44*** −0.06
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.45) (0.14) (0.14)
Coincident Index −0.20** −0.07 −0.15** 0.13 −0.13* −0.42***
(Standard Error) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.22) (0.08) (0.11)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 1.88 1.77 2.52** 3.12*** 11.16*** 3.22***
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 2.03 9.38*** 4.29** 1.32 5.70*** 10.74***
Consumption 25.96*** 35.30*** 12.94*** 0.95 1.95 0.76
Investment 14.40*** 237.00*** 15.41*** 0.22 0.56 1.55
Employment 10.63*** 1.71 84.46*** 0.92 8.12*** 2.98*
Unemployment 1.40 4.01** 1.86 1.02 0.45 65.65***
Inﬂation 4.90*** 0.48 5.48*** 1.71 3.45** 0.92
Government Expenditures 6.22*** 3.90** 2.45* 1.55 12.38*** 1.49
Transfer Payments 0.63 0.16 0.04 1.57 0.88 0.04
Tax Receipts 3.32** 2.15 6.29*** 0.40 6.00*** 3.62**
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.30 0.98 0.96 0.81 0.89 0.81
AIC 470.94 204.79 260.31 695.96 362.75 627.90
BIC 554.62 288.47 343.99 779.64 446.43 711.57
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,186).
3. Null hypothesis: All 2 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(2,186).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table A8: Regression Results - Learning Gain = 0.04, Lag Length = 4
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment Unemployment Inﬂation
Fiscal Uncertainty Coeﬃcients1
Government Expenditures −0.08 0.03 −0.06 −0.24 0.36** −0.26
(Standard Error) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.48) (0.17) (0.19)
Tax Receipts 0.13 −0.05 0.10 −0.01 −0.01 0.29*
(Standard Error) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.35) (0.16) (0.16)
Transfer Payments −0.07 −0.07 −0.03 −0.34* 0.26*** −0.09
(Standard Error) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.08)
Government Debt 0.14 0.00 0.09* −1.01*** 0.43*** −0.12
(Standard Error) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.32) (0.12) (0.15)
Coincident Index −0.10 −0.01 −0.10* 0.35 −0.20 −0.49***
(Standard Error) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.24) (0.13) (0.12)
Fiscal Uncertainty Joint Wald2 1.27 1.03 1.74 4.62*** 13.16*** 3.76***
Wald Tests for Controls3
Real GDP 5.20*** 4.14*** 7.64*** 2.30* 2.70** 4.85***
Consumption 5.12*** 15.86*** 4.38*** 1.75 2.70** 1.93
Investment 5.61*** 105.89*** 4.59*** 1.10 1.29 3.68***
Employment 4.50*** 0.51 41.17*** 1.30 7.01*** 2.03*
Unemployment 1.27 1.35 1.57 4.81*** 0.97 28.03***
Inﬂation 2.91** 0.91 3.53*** 2.20* 4.61*** 0.43
Government Expenditures 4.93*** 1.86 1.03 1.34 6.14*** 2.01*
Transfer Payments 1.49 1.57 1.25 1.47 0.56 0.83
Tax Receipts 2.18* 1.84 3.47*** 0.41 4.42*** 1.72
Fit Statistics:
Adjusted R-square 0.36 0.98 0.96 0.82 0.91 0.83
AIC 469.13 202.18 267.39 694.75 336.97 623.92
BIC 613.06 346.11 411.32 838.67 480.90 767.85
1. Standard errors are Newey West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust.
2. Null hypothesis: Coeﬃcients on all ﬁscal uncertainty variables are equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(5,168).
3. Null hypothesis: All 4 lags of the given control variable have coeﬃcients equal to zero. Wald F-test ∼ F(4,168).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
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Table A9: Impact from an Extreme Decade of Fiscal Uncertainty (Learning Gain = 0.01)
(a) Magnitude of Extreme Change in Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty (Learning Gain = 0.01)
Largest Value Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty = 4.43 Date: 2009 Quarter 2
Smallest Value in Decade Preceding = -0.10 Date: 2004 Quarter 2
(b) Estimates using ARDL with 1 Lag
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.43*** −1.94 −2.92 −0.97
Consumption −0.20*** −0.89 −1.34 −0.44
Investment −0.29*** −1.30 −2.09 −0.51
Employment −0.03 −0.16 −6.64 6.33
Unemployment −0.15 −0.68 −1.77 0.40
Inﬂation −0.21** −0.94 −1.87 −0.02
(c) Estimates using ARDL with 2 Lags
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.32*** −1.45 −2.26 −0.65
Consumption −0.16*** −0.73 −1.16 −0.29
Investment −0.19*** −0.85 −1.44 −0.25
Employment −0.21 −0.93 −5.73 3.86
Unemployment −0.05 −0.24 −1.32 0.85
Inﬂation −0.23 −1.03 −2.37 0.30
(d) Estimates using ARDL with 4 Lags
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.29*** −1.32 −2.14 −0.50
Consumption −0.07 −0.32 −0.82 0.17
Investment −0.21*** −0.96 −1.43 −0.50
Employment −0.39 −1.78 −12.70 9.14
Unemployment 0.02 0.08 −1.12 1.28
Inﬂation −0.26 −1.18 −3.22 0.86
* P-value < 0.10, ** P-value < 0.05, *** P-value < 0.01
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Table A10: Impact from an Extreme Decade of Fiscal Uncertainty (Learning Gain = 0.04)
(a) Magnitude of Extreme Change in Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty (Learning Gain = 0.04)
Largest Value Coincident Fiscal Uncertainty = 6.13 Date: 2009 Quarter 2
Smallest Value in Decade Preceding = -1.07 Date: 2003 Quarter 4
(b) Estimates using ARDL with 1 Lag
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.27*** −1.92 −3.18 −0.66
Consumption −0.11*** −0.81 −1.40 −0.22
Investment −0.21*** −1.53 −2.31 −0.75
Employment 0.29** 2.12 0.32 3.91
Unemployment −0.29*** −2.05 −3.15 −0.96
Inﬂation −0.20*** −1.46 −2.55 −0.36
(c) Estimates using ARDL with 2 Lags
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.20** −1.44 −2.87 −0.01
Consumption −0.07 −0.49 −1.23 0.26
Investment −0.15** −1.08 −1.91 −0.25
Employment 0.13 0.93 −2.22 4.09
Unemployment −0.13* −0.97 −2.07 0.13
Inﬂation −0.42*** −3.01 −4.61 −1.41
(d) Estimates using ARDL with 4 Lags
Variable Coeﬃcient Impact 95% Lower
Bound
95% Upper
Bound
Real GDP −0.10 −0.69 −1.85 0.46
Consumption −0.01 −0.08 −0.75 0.59
Investment −0.10* −0.69 −1.49 0.11
Employment 0.35 2.54 −0.79 5.88
Unemployment −0.20 −1.42 −3.21 0.36
Inﬂation −0.49*** −3.53 −5.28 −1.78
* P-value < 0.10, ** P-value < 0.05, *** P-value < 0.01
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Figure A1: Least-Squares Learning Predictions
Learning Gain = 0.01
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Figure A2: Least-Squares Learning Prediction Errors
Learning Gain = 0.01
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Figure A3: Fiscal Policy Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.01
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Figure A4: Least-Squares Learning Predictions
Learning Gain = 0.04
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Figure A5: Least-Squares Learning Prediction Errors
Learning Gain = 0.04
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Figure A6: Fiscal Policy Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.04
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Figure A7: Unique Components of Fiscal Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.01
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Figure A8: Unique Components of Fiscal Uncertainty
Learning Gain = 0.04
